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Abstract—Schedule pressure is common in the commercial
world, where late delivery of a product means delayed
income and loss of profit. 12 Research spacecraft developed
by NASA, on the other hand, tend to be driven by the high
cost of launch vehicles and the public scrutiny of failure--
the primary driver is ensuring proper operation in space for
a system that cannot be retrieved for repair. The Lunar
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) development faced both
schedule pressure and high visibility. The team had to
balance the strong push to meet a launch date against the
need to ensure that this first mission for Exploration
succeeded. This paper will provide an overview of the
mission from concept through its first year of operation and
explore some of the challenges the systems engineering
team faced taking a mission from preliminary design review
to pre-ship review in 3 years.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In January 2004, the President of the United States
announced the “Vision for Space Exploration.” As part of
this vision, the U.S. would send a series of robotic missions
to the moon beginning no later than 2008. The first mission
became known as the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO),
and NASA released an Announcement of Opportunity (AO)
for the LRO instruments in June of 2004, with a target
launch of October 2008. Headquarters selected six
instruments, each with a strong relationship to recently-
flown payloads, in December 2004 and started funding for
the mission in early 2005. Headquarters then added a
synthetic aperture radar technology demonstration to LRO
in April 2005. The Mini-RF development was significantly
behind the other instruments, and its data rate and power
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consumption were significant. The early vision of a
relatively small spacecraft with a few instruments had
turned into something larger, but it was still important to the
new Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) at
Headquarters that LRO launch before the end of 2008.
2. LRO OBJECTIVES
LRO’s primary purpose was early reconnaissance in
preparation for later return of humans to the moon.
Certainly significant reconnaissance had been done in the
equatorial regions of the moon prior to and during the
Apollo missions, but long-duration stays on the moon would
be difficult in the equatorial regions, due to the large swings
in temperature (from -140 to +140 degrees C) and the two-
week-long periods of darkness. The polar regions are much
more hospitable, with a low sun angle, nearly continuous
daylight on some mountain peaks, and permanently-
shadowed craters that could harbor water. LRO specifically
set out to characterize landing sites, identify resources, and
characterize the radiation environment, particularly near the
poles. The six instruments were specifically selected to
accomplish these objectives, with robust overlapping of the
measurements necessary to characterize the lighting,
topography, and surface features of polar landing sites.
LRO promised to improve our map resolution by several
orders of magnitude.
3. LRO RESULTS
On September 16, 2010, LRO completed its mission for
ESMD, meeting all mission objectives. The Science
Mission Directorate has begun a science mission with LRO
that will last another two years. The full details of the
spacecraft and instruments can be found elsewhere [1].
Figure 1 shows the spacecraft in flight configuration, with
the instruments labeled. What follows is a brief description
of the LRO instruments and some interesting findings.
CRaTER
The Cosmic Ray Telescope for the Effect of Radiation
(CRaTER) instrument is characterizing the radiation
environment around the moon. The instrument includes
tissue equivalent plastics which enable it to measure how
much radiation would be deposited in human tissue.
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CRaTER has operated during a period when the galactic
cosmic rays were at the highest levels ever recorded (due to
low solar activity). It has detected unexpectedly high
radiation levels near the surface of the moon, which are still
under investigation.
Figure 1: LRO Spacecraft with Instruments Identified
Diviner
The Diviner Lunar Radiometer Experiment measures the
infrared emissions from the lunar surface. Diviner has
measured the coldest place ever recorded in the solar
system. Some permanently shadowed craters near the lunar
poles are below 35 K! Using Diviner’s nine infrared
channels, scientists have analyzed the global silicate
mineralogy of the moon [2].
LAMP
The Lyman Alpha Mapping Project (LAMP) instrument
measures the spectrum of the moon in reflected ultraviolet
light. LAMP uses the galactic background Lyman alpha
emissions to illuminate permanently shadowed regions. The
instrument has discovered that permanently shadowed
craters reflect less Lyman Alpha light than the rest of the
lunar surface. The exact cause is still under investigation.
LEND
The Lunar Exploration Neutron Detector counts neutrons
that come from the lunar surface. These neutrons are
released when cosmic rays strike the material on the moon.
Hydrogen is a very good absorber of these neutrons, so
LEND has identified regions of hydrogen concentration.
The most surprising discovery about these hydrogen
concentrations is that they are not always within
permanently shadowed regions.
LOLA
The Lunar Orbiter Laser Altimeter is mapping the
topography of the moon to an accuracy of better than 1 m
with respect to the moon’s center. LOLA uses a beam
splitter and expander to create five separate 5 m laser spots
on the ground. Taking five simultaneous measurements
enables determination of not only the elevation, but also the
slope in the region of the measurement. With well over 2
billion individual measurements, LOLA has created global
topographic maps with horizontal resolution in the polar
regions better than 50 m. This data set has allowed
scientists to identify all craters greater than 20 km in
diameter, then use that data set to measure the size
distribution over time of objects that have struck the moon
[3]. Figure 2 shows LOLA-measured topography in the
vicinity of the Apollo 11 landing site.
Figure 2: Image of LOLA Altitude Data (scale in m) [4]
LROC
The LRO Camera is composed of three separate cameras.
The Wide-Angle Camera (WAC) provides 100 m pixel
resolution in seven spectral bands (both optical and UV),
with a 60 km swath width. The two Narrow-Angle Cameras
(NAC) provide side-by-side coverage with 0.5 m pixels and
a 2.5 km swath width, resulting in a total swath of 5 km.
The cameras are line imagers, so they create pictures as
LRO moves in its orbit. In addition to providing high-
resolution imagery for possible landing sites, LROC has
observed hardware left on the moon by previous missions,
providing high-accuracy coordinates and context. An
LROC image of Lunokhod 1, a rover launched by the
Soviets and last operating in 1971, has enabled Earth-based
laser ranging off of a retro-reflector on the rover [5].
Previous attempts to find the reflector were unsuccessful,
because the location estimate was off by several kilometers.
Figure 3 shows the Apollo 17 landing site. Hardware and
disturbed regolith (from the astronauts’ activity) is visible.
Mini-RF
The Mini-Radio-Frequency is a synthetic-aperture radar
with full polarization capability. This instrument was flown
as a technology demonstration. It is proving its worth,
generating images and maps of the moon’s surface
properties at S-band and X-band, with 15 m and 150 m
resolution modes.
LCROSS Impact
The Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite
(LCROSS) rode as a secondary payload on the LRO launch
vehicle. LCROSS hung on to the upper stage of the Atlas V
and directed it in to a permanently-shadowed crater near the
moon’s south pole on October 9, 2009. LCROSS monitored
the plume from the impact before striking the moon itself.
Mission scientists used LRO data to identify the target, a
permanently-shadowed region with a high hydrogen
concentration. The LRO orbit was timed so that the
spacecraft flew past the targeted site a few minutes after
impact. The LAMP instrument identified volatiles from the
moon in the plume, and the Diviner instrument imaged the
heat left over from the impact on subsequent orbits.
Analysis of the LCROSS data indicates the presence of
water in the ejected plume.
4. PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENT DURING
DEVELOPMENT
Systems engineering is more than simply a technical
process. Certainly technical requirements and constraints
drive a system design, but programmatic considerations,
such as cost, schedule, and political perceptions, will also
exert significant influence on the technical decisions the
team makes. A brief description of this environment will
make the systems engineering approach much more
understandable.	 The in-house development team at
Figure 3: LRO Camera Image of Apollo 17 Site [6]
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) developed the
conceptual design of LRO, prior to the instrument AO
release. Because the instruments were proposed to this
concept, it led to the primary mission design constraints.
The only major change to these initial constraints was a
change in launch vehicle shortly before the mission
Preliminary Design Review (PDR). The biggest
programmatic driver of the mission was the schedule
constraint, although several other factors came in to play.
Development Organization
NASA decided at the beginning to designate LRO as an in-
house mission at GSFC. GSFC generally takes on a certain
amount of in-house work, where NASA engineers lead the
design and build of the flight hardware—designing circuit
cards, software, and structures, with the spacecraft
assembled and tested in GSFC facilities—in order to
maintain technical expertise within the organization. LRO
provided significant training opportunity for a number of
GSFC engineers, and NASA gained the added benefit of not
locking into a large spacecraft contract during the rapidly
changing political environment of the Exploration Initiative
startup (see Changing Program Office below). The in-
house leadership team included a number of individuals
who had worked on the Small Explorer missions in the
1990’s. This experience with rapid, low-cost, highly-
reliable, single-string spacecraft provided an excellent
foundation for the LRO development.
At its peak, the LRO core systems team included 15 GSFC
employees and on-site support contractors. These engineers
looked across the project from different perspectives,
including specialties such as modes & operations, launch
vehicle interface, avionics, manufacturing, verification, and
requirements management support. The extended systems
team included the core team and all of the subsystem leads.
Although the subsystem leads primarily focused down into
their subsystems, they were also expected to understand
how their piece of the system interacted at the system level.
The subsystem leads participated in weekly project meetings
and major architecture decisions, and they were key
contributors to the risk management process. The extended
systems team provided the technical leadership for the entire
LRO team.
Although the systems team had a hierarchical structure, with
the Mission Systems Engineer (MSE) at the top, team
members were encouraged to make decisions within their
area of responsibility, only elevating decisions when the
impact crossed multiple boundaries. For simple interfaces
or interactions, subsystem leads worked the details among
themselves, with a member of the core system team
approving the solution. For major architecture decisions,
such as the one described in the Launch Vehicle Change
section below, the extended systems team provided the
technical, schedule, and cost perspectives that both the MSE
and the Project Manager (PM) needed to make the final
decision. The PM strongly encouraged diverse perspectives,
and selected team members who complemented each other.
The MSE worked diligently to ensure team members
throughout the organization spoke up when something
seemed amiss, following through to understand the situation
and provide feedback to the team on the resolution.
Design Constraints
Early on, the LRO team chose a 50 km, polar operational
orbit. This orbit enabled very high-resolution imagery and
laser altimetry across the entire moon. For orbits lower than
this, the orbit maintenance must be done more often than
monthly, due to the asymmetry of the moon’s gravitational
field. This orbit became a constraint on the flight system.
From 50 km altitude, the moon fills almost half of the field
of view, so the transition from noon to midnight in a 113-
minute orbit really drove some aspects of the thermal
design. The thermal considerations were probably the
biggest change for the LRO instruments from their heritage,
mostly Mars, designs. The polar orbit is inertially fixed, so
it experiences all sun angles over the course of a year,
resulting in a two-axis gimbal on the solar array.
Since the orbit maintenance at 50 km is fairly high, the
instrument AO defined a 14-month mission, with the first
two months used for instrument commissioning. A year of
operations provided enough time to get thorough, high-
resolution coverage at the poles. Since LRO was intended
to be the first in a series of missions, and since it would be a
short mission, LRO was designated as reliability class “C”,
meaning that it would be single-string. The initial launch
vehicle was the 3-stage Delta II. The third stage is spin
stablilized, and the total capability to a lunar trajectory was
1480 kg. The change in launch vehicle is described later.
Changing Program Office
The LRO team formulated the mission and spacecraft
design during a turbulent period. NASA’s Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) at Headquarters was
just getting started, and the Robotic Lunar Exploration
Program moved from Goddard Space Flight Center to Ames
Research Center and then to Marshall Space Flight Center.
LRO’s original design approach was “design to cost”, but
after selection of the six instruments and technology
demonstration payload, the LRO team’s direction was
“design to requirements”. Cost became less of a concern to
ESMD for a while, and there was a strong desire to fly
Mini-RF. As the LRO approached confirmation review, and
the full cost of the increased requirements became apparent,
the team was again directed to focus on cost. This pinch on
cost around the time of the PDR helped the team focus on
what expenses were critical and which were not. It turned
out to be an effective measure to enable the LRO
management to pull together a focused project plan, but
with sufficient funds to deliver on schedule.
Schedule	 one had ever flown as massive a spacecraft that was almost
half fuel on this rocket.
Because this was the first mission for ESMD, the
organization’s political credibility became linked to LRO’s
successful launch in the Presidentially-mandated year of
2008. There was enormous pressure on LRO’s project
management to hold schedule. After the Critical Design
Review (CDR), ESMD offered the project additional
funding if it could save schedule. Because all of the major
contracts were already in place, very little additional
funding could be spent effectively, but the project was able
to apply some money to some key areas, like an interface
test for the transponder. This spending had the effect of
keeping all components on schedule, preventing a single
delayed component from holding back the entire
development.
The Independent Review Team expressed concern with the
schedule at each of the reviews. The LRO engineers
frequently expressed concerns with meeting schedule. The
biggest challenge for the project management and systems
engineering team was the balance of schedule against
technical risk. Early on, someone on the team found in a
fortune cookie the note in Figure 4, which summed up the
feelings of many on the engineering team. The challenge
became finding ways to get things done faster without
compromising the technical integrity of the mission. Before
getting into the details of how we did this, a description of
the launch vehicle change will highlight several aspects of
the LRO systems approach, demonstrating the large
influence schedule pressure put on the system architecture.
The actual schedule executed by LRO is shown in Table 1.
Figure 4: LRO Fortune Cookie
Launch Vehicle Change
In September 2005, the propulsion team identified a risk
associated with the nutation time constant (NTC) of LRO’s
propellant tank. In order to support the mission design,
including the lunar orbit insertion burn, the delta V for the
mission was 1258 m/s. Because of the short development
schedule, the team baselined a mono-propellant hydrazine
system, resulting in nearly half of the launch mass being
fuel. The tight mass and volume constraints of the Delta II
led to a custom tank design for the mission. With the spin-
stabilized upper stage, the Delta II had strict requirements
on the system’s NTC, so that sloshing of the fuel would not
cause nutation beyond the capability of the Delta’s control
system. LRO’s combination of mass and fuel fraction was
outside the experience base of the Delta launch vehicle—no
Table 1: LRO Actual Milestones
The team expected that they could eventually come up with
a tank design that would meet the NTC requirement, but we
would not know for sure until the spring of 2006, after some
drop-tower testing. For LRO, waiting six months to
determine whether or not to change tank configurations was
unacceptable. The systems team immediately investigated
several options including a bi-propellant system, a different
launch vehicle without a spinning upper stage, and a solid
rocket motor for the lunar orbit insertion burn. Because a
change in launch vehicles was outside the decision space of
the project, and because the bi-propellant system would take
too long to develop and it may still have a NTC issue, we
selected the solid rocket motor option and began designing
the stage and redesigning the spacecraft structure. We then
briefed ESMD in November 2005.
At the ESMD briefing, we pointed out that a change to the
non-spinning Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV),
in addition to solving the NTC issue, would add sufficient
margin to the mission to use surplus propellant tanks from
the X-38 program, and it would add additional capability to
launch a secondary payload. Right at the briefing, the
Associate Administrator decided that the advantages of
lower development risk for LRO (existing tanks) and
capability for an extra payload (later became LCROSS)
easily offset the higher cost of the larger launch vehicle. He
switched LRO to the EELV and directed the team to
optimize the design for launch on this vehicle.
The new vehicle with the existing tanks meant that the
mechanical team needed to start over with their design. We
had learned quite a bit about the thermal challenges of this
orbit during the preliminary design work that had already
been done. So the systems engineering team provided some
guiding principles for the new structure design:
AO Released Jun 2004
Funding start Jan 2005
System Requirements Review Aug 2005
Launch	 vehicle	 changed	 to
EELV
Nov 2005
Preliminary Design Review Feb 2006
Confirmation Review May 2006
Critical Design Review Nov 2006
Start of spacecraft integration Jan 2008
Pre-Environmental Review Jun 2008
National	 launch priorities	 slip
LRO to 2009 launch
Jul 2008
Thermal Vacuum start Oct 2008
Environmental testing complete Jan 2009
Pre-Ship Review Feb 2009
Launch on June 18, 2009 Jun 2009
(1) We set the mass limit for the system using the fuel
capability of two X-38 tanks. With our delta V, the
extra dry mass capability for LRO was about 174 kg,
but 114 kg of that was consumed with the heavier tanks
and the accommodations, leaving a dry mass-margin
increase of 60 kg. Our overall margin at the time went
from 24% to 28%.
(2) We created a modular spacecraft configuration that
would enable parallel assembly, making up the
schedule lost by changing configurations. All of the
avionics were mounted to a single deck for table-top
integration. The propulsion system could be built up as
a separate assembly, with all of the plumbing and
thrusters integral to that assembly. We had a graphite-
composite instrument module for accurate payload
pointing stability. During system-level Integration and
Test (I&T), we had three teams working
simultaneously. The propulsion module was pressure
proof-tested by itself, while we integrated avionics in a
clean room and installed heaters and thermostats on the
instrument module in another location.
(3) We coupled significant mass together in order to
minimize the thermal transients in the noon-midnight
orbit. The avionics deck contained heat pipes to spread
the heat and transfer it to a zenith-facing radiator, and
the wheels were coupled into the same radiator. The
instruments were thermally isolated with a clear view of
space away from the sun. Coupling the mass together
also reduced heater power, especially during the long
lunar eclipses, when the moon passes through the
Earth’s shadow.
The structural re-design put the mechanical and thermal
teams significantly behind when we held our mission
Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in February of 2006.
The propulsion team had originally planned to procure an
integrated propulsion system, but the use of in-hand
components shifted this effort in house. This change greatly
increased the workload for the propulsion organization, but
it also provided some good opportunities for hands-on
experience. The other subsystems were ahead of PDR level
at this time, so we were able to hold a successful review,
with mechanical, thermal, propulsion, and attitude control
performance peer reviews in May 2006 covering the
necessary system-level issues. By CDR in November of
2006, these subsystems had caught up with the rest of the
system. Changing structures was painful for a while, but in
the end it proved to be quite a blessing, with the modular
integration and the coupled thermal design.
As a side note, the use of the existing propulsion hardware
was not as inexpensive as one might expect. The LRO team
needed to review all of the requirements and paperwork
associated with the X-38 hardware. The attitude control
thrusters were not specified to handle the throughput that
LRO required, so the team needed to procure additional
testing for those components. All of the details necessary to
ensure application of existing hardware to a new mission
add up to a significant effort, but this effort is essential to
ensure proper operation in the system.
5. CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES
Designing for parallel development with a modular design
was one way that the LRO team was able to get things done
faster without compromising technical integrity. Other
approaches included working harder, adding more people,
testing early, managing risk, challenging processes, focusing
on people, and making decisions effectively.
Work Harder
Obviously working harder can get things done faster. The
challenge is motivating people. The LRO management was
very good at this. In Daniel Pink’s book [8], he describes
three components to motivation: autonomy, mastery, and
purpose.
Autonomy—The project management and the systems team
invited team members at all levels of LRO to promote their
best ideas in support of the mission as a whole. The team
members felt ownership for these solutions, and felt they
had control over their own destiny. We delegated decisions
to lower levels as much as possible, with systems
engineering holding the big-picture view, facilitating
communication, documenting design decisions, and
verifying system-level performance. Team members
understood their control over mission success and were,
therefore, motivated to excel.
Mastery—We challenged our experts in a constructive way.
The systems engineers used basic physics to double check
solutions, and we expected the experts to be able to explain
their results in those terms. We encouraged discipline leads
to represent their own perspective, but with an eye to the
system impact. We expected ownership and probing inquiry
of anomalies and design issues.
Purpose—In some respects, this was the easiest motivator.
We were headed to the moon, paving the way for new
exploration. It was an engineer’s dream. But the moon
doesn’t excite everyone. The technician putting a part on a
board does not always see the bigger picture, so we
frequently reminded everyone of the criticality of every
piece of the system. We walked around and talked with the
technicians, explaining the excitement of the mission and
the importance of each piece. And when we completed a
review or met a milestone, we held a celebration. We
created a sense of team that became like a family, where we
all enjoyed each other’s successes, because we each knew
that each victory got us closer to mission success.
Add More People
In some areas, additional people helped us move faster. The
mechanical team was able to bring in a number of additional
designers to work the details of piece parts and a few
additional leaders to take charge of the modular structure
components. This is primarily how they were able to make
up for the time lost in the launch vehicle change. But if
there are not enough leaders, extra manpower will result in
idle hands, potentially distracting other team members. Be
clear about the responsibilities of new team members.
Test Early
We conducted interface tests with each instrument and with
most other components as soon as breadboards were
available. At nearly every one of these tests, we discovered
problems that would have been a disaster during system-
level integration. For example, we added an interface test
for the transponder, and that test discovered two signals
were reversed, a reset had not been implemented per the
specification, a software error on the spacecraft side caused
repeated strobing of the hardware reset, the auxiliary
command port worked better with a square wave rather than
the sine wave specified, and the telemetry database was
incorrect. These problems were trivial to fix on the
breadboard system (most were corrected during the test) and
they cost nothing to fix on the flight system, since it had not
yet been built. Had we not done the interface testing, we
would likely have had some or all of these problems show
up during the flight integration in February 2008. It would
have taken a couple of months to correct the issues on the
flight unit, and our entire spacecraft integration would have
been set back. The time saved with this and every other
interface test was well worth the time required to execute
the tests. During all of LRO’s system integration, we found
only one interface problem (a reversed 1553 transformer),
an incredible testament to the benefits of interface testing.
Manage Risk
The LRO risk management process worked very well. The
mission systems engineer and the risk manager met with
each subsystem lead individually every month. During this
meeting, we would update the subsystem’s risks and we
would discuss anything that might be worrying the lead.
The relaxed atmosphere, with the meeting conducted at the
lead’s office, led to frank discussions of issues and potential
problems. By meeting monthly, we were able to keep the
database current and satisfy monthly reporting out from the
project, but more importantly, we were able to identify and
begin to mitigate things that would have become serious
problems without project-level action.
Our monthly risk management board meetings at the project
level provided a forum for discussing the risks we
identified. These discussions gave the project managers
critical insight, and it also provided a forum to discuss at the
project level where we should best spend our resources.
Because of our schedule, if someone identified a critical
risk, we would not wait for a monthly meeting to address it.
We would gather the necessary engineers and managers and
begin risk mitigation immediately. 	 The previously
discussed risk associated with the propellant tank NTC and
its impact on the launch vehicle is a good example of LRO’s
risk management in operation for a critical risk.
A more routine example of LRO risk management involves
the late delivery of a part on the Command and Data
Handling (C&DH) power supply board. At a monthly
meeting, the lead identified that a part might arrive late,
delaying the integration of his flight hardware. This was an
issue the lead had raised with the project-level parts support,
but systems engineering was not aware that there might be a
delay until the monthly meeting. The project decided to
build up a flight spare card using a slightly lower-quality
part for this one area. This spare card enabled the C&DH
lead to continue with his integration, while our quality
engineer started investigating the risk associated with flying
this lower-quality part. All of this action bought enough
time so that when the flight part did actually get delayed, we
could keep moving while we waited for its delivery. In the
end, the flight part came in early enough to integrate with
the flight system before qualification testing. Had our lead
not mentioned his concern during a risk meeting, we would
have ended up delaying the entire flight integration by a
month or more.
Challenge the Standard Processes
The LRO team habitually questioned why we did things the
way we did them. If we did not have time for a particular
test, we did not simply skip the test, we figured out why the
test was required and then figured out a better way to
accomplish the same thing. Procurements are an area that
generally has well-established processes, some of which are
based on previous procurements, whether or not they were
successful. The LRO systems team did not leave
procurements to chance. We had significant systems
support for each of our major purchases of spacecraft
hardware, ensuring the proper environmental requirements
and good interfaces. We had a manufacturing engineer on
our team who worked with each vendor after contract
award. This engineer tailored our Statement of Work and
our specification in order to use the vendor’s processes as
much as possible without sacrificing quality. This engineer
checked the preliminary parts lists for any potential risks,
and he ensured that the vendor planned to do the right tests.
These early meetings made sure that the vendor understood
the LRO requirements and understood the importance of the
component to mission success. Because of this
collaborative approach, we saw almost no problems with
procured components at the time of delivery. The pre-ship
reviews for each component went remarkably smoothly.
Focus on the People
We solved problems quickly by bringing our full talent to
bear. LRO systems engineering actively encouraged diverse
perspectives and minority opinions. Although these are
popularly stated goals, it is not easy to get this input from
most people. Especially when there is a close sense of team,
individuals are reluctant to rock the boat or express an
unpopular position. Frequently people will not express an
opinion because they do not want to be a bother or they do
not realize the full, system-level impact of their concern.
And sometimes people do not think their voice will make a
difference. The LRO systems team countered these effects
by actively listening to concerns, and following up with at
least an investigation. It is important to follow up with the
individual to describe the disposition of the concern, even if
the best course of action is to proceed as planned. If an
individual hears why his concern was set aside (perhaps
other concerns were more pressing), then he is more likely
to raise a concern in the future, as opposed to the situation
where it appears to him that his concern was totally ignored.
It is not easy to encourage everyone to let you know what is
bothering them. Some people will bring up too many issues
(the constant worriers); some people’s styles do not match;
some people have less experience, so they do not know what
might be a concern at the system level; and some people just
think differently. But it is the different perspective that adds
the strength to the team. Once launched, a spacecraft is
usually irretrievable. The systems team must find all of the
fatal flaws before that launch. Different perspectives fill in
the blind spots, helping us to see where things might go
wrong.
A great example is the LRO coarse sun sensor (CSS) circuit
design. During system-level testing of the CSS’s, the
engineers who were performing the test noticed a very small
discrepancy in the current flow (on the order of a few micro
amps). The mission systems engineer encouraged these
engineers to keep digging into the source of the discrepancy,
even though he expected it was just some bookkeeping
mistake. The engineers scheduled multiple tests on the
spacecraft, to the point where the I&T manager started to
complain about their chasing of what appeared to be
nothing, but the systems engineer defended them.
Eventually, they tracked the issue to a flaw in the circuit that
read the CSS’s. Although subtle in the test, this flaw was
big enough that the sensors would have been essentially
useless in flight. We needed to remove the C&DH box and
change some resistors. Had these engineers dropped the
issue, LRO would have launched with non-functioning
sensors that were critical to acquisition of the sun. We
might have lost the mission.
Make Decisions and Move On
them into an understanding of the situation—we do it all the
time with the diverse input of our five senses. If we try to
bypass this capability with some rote process that looks at
each parameter individually, we are more likely to end up
with the wrong answer. The key is getting perspectives
from multiple people to reduce the bias. With that input and
a list of the factors that play into the choice, the decision
maker has what he needs.
The LRO team did not spend a lot of time looking for other
options if we found one that met schedule, cost, and
performance requirements. By choosing the first viable
solution, the team did not always reach an “optimal”
decision, but since the schedule was tight, it was usually
quicker to take that path. The biggest challenge with this
approach was presenting the results to review teams.
Reviewers expect to see evidence of careful, exhaustive
trade studies, with clear, analytic rationale. We did perform
analysis when it made sense (such as determining the mass
margin for each of the propulsion options), but we did not
have the luxury of spending six months analyzing the
nutation time constant of our tank. The review teams were
generally satisfied with the list of criteria we used to make
the decision—they could then use their own judgment to
assess the reasonableness of the decision.
Decisions cannot wait for complete information. One of
LRO’s major trades involved the data storage system. The
original baseline system used commercial hard drives.
Radiation testing demonstrated that several parts in the
drives might have issues in the space environment. The
experts believed that we may be able to come up with some
circuitry to handle the issues. We needed to decide whether
to continue down this path, or create a new RAM-based
Data Storage Board (DSB) design. We only had a notional
design for the DSB solution, with very little engineering to
back it up. But our engineers had built similar boards
before. The mission was beyond PDR, and the rest of the
C&DH was well on its way to the CDR. LRO could not
wait for a preliminary design of the DSB’s before choosing.
With the information available, we decided to make the
switch to the DSB, and we did not look back. As with all
LRO decisions, we proceeded at full speed on the chosen
path, only considering new options if we hit an obstacle.
The DSB board design caught up with the rest of the
C&DH, and the software team did fine with the change in
mass storage (although there were a few bumps there, too).
6. IMPLEMENTATION
There is no fool-proof method to make multi-parameter
decisions with high-stakes risks. LRO could have quickly
fallen behind if we took too long to make these decisions,
and we could have failed spectacularly if we got an
important one wrong. The LRO team, and particularly the
systems engineering team, handled important trades by
taking input from multiple people (getting those diverse
perspectives), analyzing what could be analyzed, and then
picking a path using engineering judgment. The human
mind is very good at taking diverse inputs and synthesizing
Component Build
The standard systems engineering process generally does
not say much about the role of systems engineering during
component build. The requirements have been allocated,
and the systems engineering team is planning for system-
level verification and validation. But the reality demands
that the systems engineer stay connected with the team,
looking for mistakes and misunderstandings. During this
phase of the LRO development, nearly every component
had some sort of unforeseeable problem, with technical risk-
vs.-schedule or subsystem-vs.-subsystem decisions required.
At the project level, LRO followed over 50 issues between
CDR and the start of I&T. Requirements were
misunderstood, performance failed to meet expectation,
parts failed, drawings were wrong, and components were
misassembled. Sometimes we needed to bring extra
engineering talent to bear on a problem, sometimes we
needed to change a requirement in one area to pick up the
slack of missed performance in another area, sometimes we
simply waived a requirement because we had enough
margin elsewhere, and sometimes the component team
worked through their own problem within their own margin.
The systems team was very active in this period, ensuring
that all components would work together when the system
was assembled. The biggest advice from this period was an
often-spoken but never-written rule on LRO: wait 24 hours
before reacting to bad news. This pause allowed the
component team to properly assess the situation and it kept
the entire team (and upper management) calm. Nearly
always, things looked better the next day. The component
team understood the situation, and they had time to generate
solution options.
System-Level Integration and Test
LRO’s avionics table-top integration (see Figure 5) went
very smoothly. Having easy access to connectors made it
very easy for the technicians to walk through the safe-to-
mate procedures. The propulsion module (see Figure 6)
integration started almost a year before the rest of the
system integration. Technicians performed over 220 welds
and installed as many thermostats for heaters. Parallel
assembly of the propulsion module, avionics module, and
instrument module converged in March 2008 (see Figure 7).
The LRO team worked the rest of I&T on scaffolding.
Figure 5: LRO Avionics Table-Top Integration
A major piece of the strategy for building a single-string
spacecraft on a short schedule was the test program. The
LRO team planned a robust test program in order to ensure
we caught any serious flaws before launch. The single-
string transponder was used for nearly all commanding and
telemetry during I&T, most of the time through the RF link
operating near threshold, so any changes in gain would be
obvious. We performed the standard EMI, vibration, shock,
and thermal vacuum tests. We conducted numerous
operations tests and flight simulations, flowing data from
the instruments all the way through the science data
processing. By the time it launched, the LRO flight system
had logged over 3400 hours of powered operation.
Figure 6: LRO Propulsion Module
Figure 7: LRO Y-Panel Installation
Launch Date Slip
In July 2008, with LRO already starting environmental tests,
other launch priorities within the government led to a delay
in LRO’s target launch date. We initially targeted the end
of February, but additional issues with the launch vehicle
and payloads ahead of LRO slipped the launch out to June
18, 2009. The team used the extra time to increase the
amount of system testing. We spent quite a bit of the time
with operations testing, ensuring that we had practiced for
major contingencies. Although we were still on track to
make a 2008 launch at the time of the slip, we would likely
have missed the target by a month or two because of a
mistake in the thermal design of the solar array gimbal
(more details later).
Closeout of Paperwork
The systems team and the mission assurance engineers
worked together to ensure clear and complete
documentation. We established acceptance reports for
components. These reports provided pointers to all of the
necessary documentation, such as verification reports and
performance measurements. They were signed by the
component owner, the subsystem lead, and the cross-cutting
systems engineers (mechanical systems, avionics systems,
and thermal systems). These acceptance reports ensured
that all necessary documentation was in place and everyone
had reviewed their piece of it.
We did not consider a requirement verified until it had a
closed work order, documenting a test or inspection, or until
it had a report in the configuration management system,
documenting the analysis. Work orders were not closed
until all associated problem reports were closed and all
paperwork was complete and in the database. LRO was
moving very fast. Our attention to paperwork detail helped
ensure that we did not let a critical item slip through the
cracks.
Launch Site Operations
The biggest challenge with launch site operations is the
attention. Senior managers suddenly get very nervous, and
bad news spreads like wildfire, even if it is not true. Any
mistake at the launch site is under the spotlight, so it is a
time for extra care. This extra care frequently results in
engineers spotting subtle quirks that have been there all
along. The systems team needs to remain calm and work
diligently through each of these issues. LRO found several
quirks during this period.
At the launch site, the project loses control of the schedule.
For a team that had been as focused on schedule as LRO,
this fact was particularly annoying. Launch vehicle and
range issues are generally not under the control of a project,
so the spacecraft team must stay flexible, ready to juggle the
work and move when necessary.
Launch operations is a time of camaraderie and stress. Part
of the team is stationed with the spacecraft, working the
flight system issues, while the rest of the team is at home,
preparing for operations. This separation does create some
division within the team, so LRO management put some
extra effort into connecting the team. A coordination
meeting for the operations team at the launch site, combined
with a tour of the launch facilities, helped everyone better
communicate and prepare for launch day. Figure 8 shows
the LRO launch on June 18, 2009.
Post-Launch Operations
LRO used a direct-insertion trajectory, following a 5-day
course to the moon. Because of very low errors in the Atlas
V launch insertion, the mid-course correction 24 hours after
launch was only 1.3 m/s (we had budgeted 25 m/s). The 40-
minute lunar orbit insertion burn on June 23 changed the
spacecraft speed by 555 m/s. The pre-launch rehearsals
paid off, with an efficient team guiding the system through
an almost flawless check-out and lunar capture. We did
encounter a couple of safe mode transitions early in the
mission—one due to overly tight safing limits and the other
due to unexpected behavior of the star trackers on the
transition from lunar occultation. The simulations never
completely match the real environment. There is much to
learn in the first few weeks of the mission, so our 24/7
staffing was essential. Later in the mission, operator errors
also precipitated a couple of safe mode transitions (sequence
error on an off-nadir slew, and a sequence error on a data
dump just before a station-keeping maneuver; we have since
implemented more rigorous review of non-routine
sequences); in every case, the spacecraft took care of itself
as designed. The instrument commissioning took a couple
of weeks longer than expected; we had consciously put less
attention on this phase pre-launch in order to ensure full
readiness in other areas. Overall, LRO operations has been
very smooth. Between mid-September 2009 and mid-
September 2010, the spacecraft operated in nominal science
mode over 96% of the time. The operations center has
collected a total of over 39,000 Gbytes of raw data in over
500,000 files.
Figure 8: LRO Launch on the Atlas V Vehicle 20
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7. OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Looking back at the LRO development, the team did some
very important things very well, and we, of course, made
some mistakes.
Mistakes
On any complicated development, with many different
people involved, expect mistakes! We all make mistakes;
the challenge is to avoid the fatal ones. Treat mistakes and
failures as a normal part of the job. Keep things out in the
open, clean up, and move on. It is critical to understand the
cause of a mistake, but avoid blame. It does not help to
punish someone who is trying his best to succeed. You can
be sure that a conscientious engineer will be much more
diligent after making a mistake that has caused much grief.
The LRO systems engineering management underestimated
the system-level complexity of the High-Gain Antenna
System and the Solar Array System. These systems both
involved deployable systems with two-axis gimbals. The
interplay of the electrical, mechanical, RF, and thermal
really needed a full-time systems engineer, but we did not
realize that until late in the build phase. On our solar array
gimbal, we almost missed a critical test—running power
through the harnessing during thermal vacuum testing. Had
we not picked up this test at the system level (thanks to a
diligent reviewer), an incorrect analysis of harness power
dissipation would have led to overheating of the system in
flight—we would probably have had a crippled gimbal.
Another error of the systems engineering management was
an underestimate of the warning signs coming from some of
our overloaded engineers. High performers sometimes do
not take a break when they should, and they sometimes take
on more than they can handle. It is the leader’s job to spot
these situations and take action. But if it is one of the
leaders getting overloaded, sometimes we don’t take the
action we should. We saw some of the warning signs, and
we did generally make sure the engineers closest to the
hardware got enough down time. But we used very little of
the extra time from the launch delay to rest our leaders. In
hindsight, I think we ended up being less efficient in some
areas, with some overloaded engineers becoming
bottlenecks, but we were very careful to avoid impacting the
integrity of the system.
Failures and Flaws
LRO had very few problems at the system level. The
biggest problems during I&T were the CSS interface circuit
and solar array gimbal power issues mentioned earlier and
high-voltage arcing in our LEND instrument. All three of
these issues resulted in hardware changes on the spacecraft.
We changed resistors in the C&DH for the CSS’s. We
added a radiator for the solar array gimbal. And we
replaced the LEND instrument with its flight spare before
launch. In flight, we have seen an arcing issue with LEND,
but the safing we put in during ground testing has helped
prevent any damage. The only other major issue with LRO
in flight has been a tight blanket on LOLA. When pointed
at cold regions of the moon, the outer layer of the blanket
shrinks enough to put some tension between the
beamsplitter and the telescope, causing some misalignment
of the two. The misalignment causes some of the beams to
miss the telescope, but the degradation has been small
enough to not impact the LOLA measurement objectives.
Lessons
Motivation—Money is not the right motivator for
intellectual challenges. LRO’s formula for motivation
closely followed Daniel Pink’s prescription of autonomy,
mastery, and purpose; with outstanding results.
Programmatic Constraints—Programmatic constraints have
a profound effect on the development. Tight schedules
force decisions and drive the direction of some decisions. A
tight budget prior to confirmation ensures that a project
makes the hard budget choices. Extra money after CDR,
while significant work is occurring in parallel, can save
schedule and probably money in the long run by keeping
one item from delaying the entire project.
Tight Schedules—Even if the schedule is tight, make sound
technical choices. Remember the fortune cookie!
Problems—When a problem pops up, wait 24 hours before
reacting. This pause gives the engineers time to understand
the situation and develop solutions.
Interface Testing—Interface tests save money in the long
run. Test early and often.
Parallel Development—Plan early for parallel development
and assembly. You can only add more people to save
schedule if the system is architected to use the extra
manpower.
Decoupled Delivery—Decouple delivery events so that
integration can move forward even if one item is late.
The Team—Systems engineering is all about the team.
Success depends on the performance of the entire team.
Some people on the team will require more effort, but the
extra effort is required to get different perspectives. Watch
for overloading, especially in those requiring little effort,
and definitely in yourself! Be flexible and optimistic.
Over 1300 people contributed to LRO’s success. Each one
brought her or his unique talents and perspectives to the
team. The end results are the spectacular maps and
discoveries of the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter.
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